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08/19/03 (Edited 05/31/06)
Introduction
The theme of this years world congress of philosophy is â??â??Philosophy Facing World Problemsâ??â?? A fitting theme for the 21st world congress on the threshold of the 21st century. Just like these years are a transition from the old century to the new one, the theme of this world congress seems to connect old ideas to new ones. The sentence itself is worthy of further reflection.
â??â??Philosophy facing World Problemsâ??â??, the sentence posits philosophy opposite to world problems, philosophy as a defender of order against the chaos of world problems. This exhibits a kind of attitude to philosophy reminiscent of the attitude in the era of enlightenment.
On the other hand, the sentence has an undertone of struggle, of a fight between philosophy and the problems in which the world seems to be enraptured. This antagonism and readiness for battle reminds me of a newer Nietzschean and postmodernist attitude, Philosophy and its opponent interlocked in a power struggle.
There is a third aspect in the sentence which needs to be highlighted. The subject â??philosophyâ?? is simple, it is without any predicate or pretense and it is pit against â??world problemsâ??, the problems having a aggrandizing adjective, â??worldâ??. This gives the sentence something of a â??mission impossibleâ??, philosophy as a lonely defender against an array of problems. The problems seem grave indeed. How can philosophy after the proclaimed death of God, the tempest of post modernity and the in human terms beastly 20th century, be a bastion for the idea of ethics? In the first part of this essay I would like to tackle this question. Can the antagonistic universe presented by postmodernism be connected to the enlightenment idea of philosophy as a defense for human civilization?
However even if the answer to this first question is â??yesâ??, there is another more sinister question to be answered. The question comes up because of the in my view unreflective character of the sentence â??philosophy facing world problemsâ??. The sentence places philosophy outside of â??world problemsâ??, solely as a possible beacon of light, not considering whether philosophy itself might be a part of the problems of today. The question is therefore whether philosophy itself is not also a part of the enemy it faces and whether it is time for philosophical self reflection. This question will be dealt with in the second part of the essay.
In the following paragraph a metaphysics of power will be outlined, while in the third paragraph the subject of power steps in the forefront.
I am aware that the topic of this first part of the essay looks dated; the interest in â??powerâ?? seems to be fading from political philosophy. It was a discussion topic from twenty years ago. Still in this paper I will fall back on those debates. Why I do that will be explained in more detail in the second part of this essay. Here I would like to defend the choice made by saying that it shouldnâ??t be considered a crime to use material not immediately contemporary. Especially in philosophy the debates of old seem to retain much of their relevance later on, or indeed even become more relevant than they were in the past. The debate on power seems to be such a topic, as will be shown in the coming paragraphs.
Now we will first examine the backdrop of the antagonistic universe in which we, according to post-modern thinking, seem to be positioned.
The universe of power
Since Nietzsche postulated his â??will to powerâ??, power has been on the philosophical agenda. Especially in post-modern approaches power has found its place as a central concept in the philosophical universe. In post-modernism the traditional philosophical search for truth was replaced by the search for the interrelatedness of truth and power. Bit by bit â??powerâ?? undermined philosophical foundations of knowledge, beginning with â??truthâ?? all the way down even to â??communicationâ??, Habermasâ?? last refuge.
The Hobbesian view of life as a war of all against all, which has come to prevail in post-modern philosophy has fractured all philosophical defenses and now a new fortress has to be built up from the ground. A new fortress sorely needed because in todayâ??s problems power seems to play a huge part. Whether the Palestine / Israeli conflict, the â??War on Terrorâ??, or the power play in allocating developmental aid recently displayed, politics shows itself more openly based on power than before. To tackle the problem of power, a metaphysics which takes power seriously is necessary, otherwise philosophy will be quickly swept aside by the powerful adversary it is pitted against, because it is fighting on unstable ground.
What would a metaphysics of power look like? If we, for the moment, give a free hand to power than we will arrive a basically Nietzschean/Foucauldian metaphysics. This metaphysics will now be outlined. We find an initially unordered universe, only to be ordered by power. Power as displayed by the subject in relation to others and to the world that surrounds him. We have a universe without any ordering principle outside the subject itself. A universe which political philosopher William Connolly calls â??ontalogicalâ??, meaning without any ontological foundation. We can put it differently; we have a complete man-made universe, based on manâ??s power.
What is power? The first description which comes to mind is power as domination, power as an excess of control by some over others. This is not what is meant here. Power taken in a metaphysical sense canâ??t mean a quality that some subjects have and others totally lack. It must be a quality that all subjects in more or less quantity have.
Power in this sense is also not as Foucault describes it, â??â??Action upon the action of others â??â??, meaning simply using influence, asserting pressure on the behavior of others. This will not do because behavior always takes place in an already established world. Only in a world which already has been shaped and ordered does it make sense to speak of behavior, and we still lack that.
For the same reason Steven Lukesâ?? description of power cannot be employed here. According to Lukes â??â??A. also exercises power over B. by influencing, shaping or determining his very wantsâ??â?? . Also this view can only serve its purpose in a world which is already defined, which already has goals and values.
Power in a metaphysical sense, needs the Nietzschean form of power, power as the ability to interpret the world. The ability to set truth, set goals, values, morals etc, the ability to create the framework in which the subject lives its live and in the course of it in its turn adds interpretation to the now existing world.
The subject shapes its world through interpretation, and will try to shape it in a for him or her most desirable way. The possibility of interpretation is power. However not every interpretation shapes the world in equal matter. Some interpretations will be superceded by others, some subjects have almost no ability or desire for interpretation .
The â??victoryâ?? of one interpretation over another is not grounded in â??truthâ??, in the ontalogical universe there is no guiding principle of reality, so consequently also no â??truthâ??. Rather the prevailing interpretation will be the one put forward with the most force. Hence there are gradations of power. There is more or less power. In this idea power fills the vacuum of truth. The role of truth is that of a legitimating of the existing balance of power. This metaphysics coincide with a rather pragmatically outlook on language. Language is used to convince. Truth is an argumentative tool, meaning that a statement is congruent with what is commonly considered to be fact. Truth is a â??rock at the backâ?? for those that argue in favor of a generally accepted statement and an obstacle to overcome, by means of generally accepted proof, by someone arguing against it. Truth is therefore â??â??a general dimension of being a right or proper thing to say as opposed to a wrong thing, in these circumstances, to this audience, for these purposes and with these intentions â??â??
As interpretation of the world takes shape, power objectifies itself first in relations between people and than in social practices and institutions. Practices and institutions form themselves in the ongoing power struggle. They harness power by mobilizing the wielders of power, the subject, in an existing cadre of interpretation. With the added power of its new members, the social practice will try to further its influence. This holds true for relative powerless social practices like folk music and the local chess club, to overlapping practices like law, nationhood and religion. Michel Foucault has analyzed the workings of power in various social practices, most notably in â??discipline and Punishâ?? and â??The History of Sexualityâ??.
Power also links â??philosophyâ?? to â??world problemsâ??. Philosophy is after all a social practice and as a social practice not privileged in any way, so like all others it is constituted by power, the very same power that seems to be the underlying cause of so many â??world problemsâ??. This realization is both destructive and constructive for the notion of â??philosophy facing world problemsâ??. This will be further elaborated in the second part. Here I only want to point out, that the relationship means that philosophy can never claim to have the antidote of truth, that it can never act as an unbiased mediator. What it can do, as a social practice based on power, a branch of the same tree, it can choose to oppose, to contrast and to criticize and offer a more profitable example. Philosophy can choose to resist.
The subject
Before we will speak of philosophy and its potential of resistance, we need to look at the subject.
We located power in the subject, or more precise, the subject is the locus of power. This means that the subject has a privileged position when it comes to relations of power. That is not to say that the subject is totally free. The world in which we as subjects operate is predefined. Predefined, and populated by the social practices we meet the minute we are born . We are not born in the metaphysical world, but in a historic world. The subject is immediately immersed in social practices and relations. Most of them so well established by history that the subject can not even begin to question them. The subject is what communitarians call an â??embedded subjectâ?? .
Does this remove all freedom of the subject? No it does not. We are born in a historic world, but not in a fixed world. The perpetual conflict of power, of interpretation on different levels, makes sure that we live in an ever changing world. Interpretations become dominant, but they also become challenged and will eventually be discarded. The subject as it is portrayed in the previous paragraph is a willing, an interpreting subject, a subject that wields power. It has the freedom to question some, if not all, social practices and institutions, but even in its freedom the subject is molded by the world of social practices in which it lives and the (power) relations with others through which it asserts itself.
Problematic as this is, the idea that the subject has some freedom follows from the metaphysical outlook in the earlier paragraph. In this metaphysics freedom is ontologically primary as Foucault states it. The ability to interpret goes hand in hand with the freedom to interpret the world how one sees fit. The fact that one will be hindered by the interpreting of others means this freedom will be limited, often severely limited even, but will not be eradicated altogether.
Here a parallel becomes visible. Like the subject who continually has to guard its own power of interpretation, its freedom, against social institutions that threaten to curb it, philosophy has to guard its position in regard to world problems that seem to render philosophy itself meaningless. In both cases the method of dealing with this seemingly stronger force is the same, the subject has resistance at its disposal and philosophy has the task to convert this local resistance into an ethics of resistance.
The ethics of resistance
The subject as it is embedded in the social practices of its time is not free to choose the mode of its resistance. The methods of resistance have to be found in existing social practices because sadly, the minute resistance takes shape and becomes a movement of significance, it will become an existing social practice itself. This does not have to be a major problem, since now we may have the beginnings of a criterion with which to judge social practices. Before we can do that we have to specify what the subject resists and to what end.
In the last paragraph we saw that the subject is basically guarding its freedom to interpret. We also saw that this freedom is severely limited but not non existent. The subject has some interpreting power left. The subject can more or less shape its attitude towards others, shape its own opinions, choose in what way it will voice those opinions and most importantly it can, again of course within limits, choose whether to go along with accepted standards, in other words to conform, or react against expectations and resist. To resist means to choose the path of non-conformation and to either reject the dominant interpretation and / or to try to interpret the world in a different way than the dominant interpretation suggests.
There is an inherent imbalance between the conformist and the resister. The conformist has behind him or her the social configuration of the times, the resister is forced to invent new ways, new relationships and defend them to a generally skeptical public. Resistance is therefore hard. Still, change ought to be possible if we agree with the characterization of the subject as an inherently interpreting subject. In a world in which the dominant interpretation has become so pervasive that no other interpretation is possible, the subject loses the faculty of interpreting, of manufacturing itself and freely shaping its relations with others.
In a post-modern world with the emphasis on power relations, ethics has the following not especially surprising assignment: To make resistance possible by making sure that no relationship becomes so dominant that resistance against it becomes unthinkable.
How can we give this notion hands and feet? Above, the subject has been described as an embedded subject, embedded in social practices and relations. In our filled world, resistance is only possible through the medium of these practices and relations. I am proposing two ethical criteria to judge these practices and relations: the first criterion should be whether these relations are prone to change themselves. Do these relations, institutions or practices give room to the subjects desire to interpret, to change the fabric of these practices? This does not mean that there should be no rules, that practices and should give up their often long established identity. What it does mean is that there should be possibilities of change. There should be constant reflection on its own functioning and the voices of those participating within and those watching from outside should be heard. Doctrines do not have to be changed in the blink of an eye, but resisters shouldnâ??t be stifled immediately.
The second criterion should be whether a given practice, institution or relation gives the subject more possibilities of shaping its own personality and relations with others . This means practices should enhance the possibilities of choice for the subject. Education is a good example here. The education of children teaches them how to use their faculties. In this learning process the children will slowly learn to reason, that is they will start to discern strategies to arrive at specific ends. These ends can be taught as fixed, such as being a good citizen, obeying, military virtue, or prowess in debating. These ends can also be left to the childâ??s own choice by providing the good end the bad sides of each end. This means teaching the child the proâ??s and conâ??s of each, also explaining the danger of military virtue, or explaining that sharp debating might hurt other people. From the perspective of an ethics of resistance, highlighting the negative sides of socially excepted goals is preferable as it gives the subject tools to resist the role dominant culture requires it to play.
In short an ethics of resistance sides with the powerless and tries to show where and when resistance to the dominant power is possible. It watches social practices and questions there absolutist character, whilst endorsing possibilities of change. Change is the outcome of new interpretation and interpretation is what a free subject does. Change and freedom are intertwined. Therefore change is a desirable effect, reasoning from the â??metaphysics of powerâ??. Practices that change themselves and practices that give the subject the opportunity to change itself promote freedom.
Back to the role philosophy can play, considering the theme â??â??philosophy facing world problemsâ??â??. Philosophy can face world problems, but only from the role of the resister, the underdog. Philosophy can open up resistance by trying to adequately articulate the position of the powerless and making their voice heard. For instance considering the argument the US put forward to (partly) justify the invasion of Iraq, that the people of Iraq were suffering under the rule of a ruthless dictator. The powerless in this complex question are easily identified, the people of Iraq. Arguing from an ethics of resistance, philosophy should try to give these people a voice, ideally by making them get heard and create the situation in which they can talk freely. This will most likely not be possible, if so philosophy should represent them, assuming the role of the lawyer and try to find arguments most honestly representing their feelings, their wants and needs. Philosophy should supply arguments from the Iraqi peopleâ??s point of view, instead of a Western European or American point of view.
Another case when philosophy should actively resist is when domination, meaning a stifling excess of power threatens to overcome an institution which has balance of power as a goal. Again the US invasion of Iraq provides a good example. When the US tries to use power play to get approval of the UN for the invasion, philosophy should defend the institution by pointing out that the US tactics are limiting the power of others, thus destroying an institution aimed at self determination. The issue is not whether the US arguments for attacking Iraq are viable, but whether their methods curb the possibility of counter arguments by others. In the same token philosophy should criticize the use of the media to advance one standpoint only.
The question if ethics is possible in an antagonistic post modern universe is yes, but there are still many problems. In this paragraph it has been argued that philosophy should represent the powerless, but do we trust philosophy with this task? Is philosophy itself sufficiently open to revision of its own ideas? Is philosophy agile enough to make use of change and value different interpretation of its values?
Part two
Philosophy in a â??freeâ?? world
The post-modern condition of the world is so often highlighted that it almost seems a litany: the end of the big stories, emphasis on local practices and a constant fluidity of ideas and experimenting with different styles, a constant mixing of old and new ideas a disappearance of borders and a crisis in ethical thinking. Discourse changes overnight.
I am aware that the ideas put forward in the first part are neither very original, nor very new; in the post-modern world post-modernism itself is old and even dated. This is the best I can do. What I find lacking is a conclusive philosophical answer to the attacks made by post-modernism, therefore I feel have to fall back on this for philosophy limited role of an ethics of resistance. What is needed in my opinion is a period of philosophical self-reflection. The philosophy of enlightenment is and has not always been the defender of reason and civilization it purports itself to be. The language of enlightenment has problems of its own, problems which need to be sorted out before we can say that philosophy itself is not a part of the problem it faces. These problems relate at least in part to an unwarranted optimism about rationality but also over confidence in the rule of law and the functioning of human rights. In this part of the essay, I want to illustrate these statements by highlighting first an aspect of the post-modern world, namely the boundrilessness of this world, and afterwards I want to point out the in my view inadequate philosophical reaction on this boundrilessness, the seeking of the solution in terms rule of law and human rights.
A world without boundaries
In the paragraph on the ethics of resistance, social practices were divided according to a criterion which stated that a social practice should enhance the possibilities of choice of the subject. Michel Foucault gave a very pessimistic account of the totalizing nature of modern social practices in his famous work â??discipline and punishâ??. I am less pessimistic than Foucault is.
Next to all kind of totalizing social practices, there are a lot of practices that do â??give the subject more possibilities of shaping its own personality and relations with othersâ?? in the sense of the second criterion of an ethics of resistance. I am thinking for instance of the discourse of â??travellingâ?? as opposed to mass tourism. More and more people explore the world by themselves and seek to interact with different cultures.
Another positive development is the internet on which people can find information and diverse opinion about every nameable subject. In general, people are much more informed than say fifty years ago. One of the consequences of these choice- and consequently freedom promoting social practices, is the disappearance of traditional boundaries.
In the post-modern world boundaries, taken in a broad sense of the world are disappearing. We can travel to the farthest corners of the world; organized trips can even be made to the South Pole. The European Union is lifting frontiers between states which for most part of their history were at war with one another. One can buy the traditional clothes of the Arab world on a market in Amsterdam, or eat Swiss food in Istanbul. Via the cellular phone one can reach the person one needs to speak to immediately or one writes an e-mail which can be read in the US the minute it has been written in New Delhi. Also in many countries the traditional boundaries between old and young, man and woman, government and governed are fading. Respect for the opinions of ones senior is not anymore self evident, Man and woman are both working and the government has to negotiate with organizations of the governed to realise its plans.
All positive developments if one wants to promote â??freeâ?? interpretation, but now it seems even freedom has its drawbacks. What kind of effect has this loss of boundaries on the subject? The effects seem to be twofold. On one hand this â??loosenessâ?? eradicates the simple â??one versus the otherâ?? thinking. Traditional enemies arenâ??t there anymore. The other lives next door and rides the same bus. This complicates simple pictures of identity. The subject cannot define itself in opposition to the other but has to define itself in relation to the other. This asks for critical thinking, curiousness and tolerance from the subject. On the other hand, or rather as a consequence, this lack of boundaries leads to insecurity and fear. Relations with the other will not always be harmonious, no boundaries also means that more behavior will be exhibited which is unacceptable to many.
Furthermore, boundaries also function as a signpost; these signposts are no longer in place or no longer unequivocally point to the same direction. Morality is not fixed anymore, but seems more and more a subjective choice of one morality rather than the other. Man is free... nothing to control him or her, finally there is room for interpretation on the part of the subject one would think.
There is a down side to this new found freedom. The subject of today has a harder time defining itself. It is faced with critical choices how to shape its identity and the now far more encompassing relations with others.
The interpreting subject will have to defend its own new found space in this ever finer net of power relations . To give this interpretation shape it will paradoxically again revert to boundaries. The subject sets its own boundaries for others to see as a signal that it is claiming this as its own space of interpretation. So we see a diversification of styles, new types of cars, the rapid spread of different kinds of music, piercings, tattoos, specially designed mobile telephones and so on.
The subject of today is more a Hobbesian subject than ever before; it is not necessarily belligerent, but mistrusting and keen on setting its own values and guarding its own autonomy. The emphasis on boundaries has shifted from the institutional level to the personal level. On the personal level however these boundaries clash with the boundaries of others, with all kinds of consequences. Competition, insecurity, fear for the other, all lessening the ties with which the subject is bound to society.
To summarize, the crumbling of boundaries on a countrywide or institutional level has led to the erection of boundaries on a personal level between people and created not only a free, interpreting subject, but for the time being also an insecure subject.
What is the philosophical reaction so far to this crumbling of boundaries and the accompanying insecurity? Philosophy as it did in the era of enlightenment, seeks recourse to law .
Human rights
In philosophy freedom is still generally looked upon as legal freedom. There is a general trust in the rule of law and the idea of human rights as guardians of freedom. Also on the website regarding the 21st world congress this trust is explicitly stated. Law is seen as a medicine for many of societyâ??s problems. Law regulates the relations of the subject to other subject and the relation between the state and the subject. By changing the law, one can change the behavior of the subject or one can change the nature of the relationship between the state and the subjects. The thought of many, put in its simplest form .
Indeed law is seen as a medicine to many social evils. The most eye catching reaction to the problem of the â??free but insecure subjectâ?? has also been a legal one. A free but insecure subject requires from law two things. First greater freedom to develop its personality, a greater autonomy, and secondly more protection from the close at hand â??otherâ??. Although these goals are contradictory, the elasticity of law allowed both to be granted, on paper. To achieve that law, and hand in hand with law philosophy, turned to the â??human rightsâ?? doctrine. Human rights were first conceived to protect the individual from the state. They were minimal, they were for protection and reduced arbitrariness of government. â??Human rightsâ?? were a revolutionary notion in enlightenment thinking and helped to establish the security of the law, over the arbitrariness of the king.
Nowadays we see that human rights, instead of regulating the relation between state and subject, are invoked to regulate the relations between subjects. Human rights not only work vertical, but now more and more horizontal. The most striking example is the right to privacy . The right to privacy means the right to a private sphere in which to fulfill his personality without hindrance . This is an especially for law very vague concept, still it is exactly that what a free and insecure subject desires: a sphere for itself alone, where it can interpret freely, without â??othersâ??. The boundary of this right is of course there where the right to the same sphere of others begins. This creates problems. Especially in fields where others necessarily infringe this autonomy, for instance in the family. Lately women argue for a more comprehensive role of the state in cases of spousal abuse, or rape within the family. They appeal to their own autonomy when asking the state to break into the right to family life.
Complications also arise when different ideas of morale conflict, the right to privacy of one can conflict with the right of free speech of another, for instance when somebody is repeatedly criticized for being gay. If the offended party turns for his or her defense to the state, than we have the state in again through the back door, through the door of human rights. Originally the escape route from influence of the state.
Human rights frequently conflict, the principle of non discrimination conflicts often with the freedom of speech, the freedom of religion conflicts with the principle of non discrimination, the right to privacy conflicts with the right of journalists of free gathering of news, and thereafter, when the stories reach the paper, with free speech and so on. Clashes of human rights are one of the most difficult cases for judges and lawyers, because there is no fixed hierarchy, in these cases we are left with ad hoc decision making while the whole enterprise of law is to prevent just that.
These problems mainly arise because in a boundaryless world, law is the wrong instrument to influence people. Law and also â??rightsâ?? set or try to set boundaries, but as we have seen in this fluid world boundaries more and more lose their significance. They less and less function as the fabric of society and more and more as a personal buffer against the other. It is no wonder than that people will use â??rights as shooting gunsâ??, to quote Brazilian philosopher Roberto Unger. Horizontally working human rights tend to enforce the haphazardly constructed personal boundaries, thereby fuelling the existing unease.
Towards ethical thinking
Philosophy seems to battle with the same insecurity that plagues the subject of the past paragraphs. In its insecurity it seeks recourse to law, recourse to enforced boundaries. The legal model does not suffice though. If ethics wants to guide human practice again a new model of ethics should be thought out. A model that moves beyond the small, reactive scope of an ethics of resistance. This model of ethics should not be allied so closely to law as enlightenment ethics was and should not rely on the legal language of rights and obligations, because an ethical model based on law will be divisive instead of overcoming the personalized boundaries between people.
A new model should in the first place be centered around the subject as a power wielding subject, intent on interpreting itself and the world around it. The subject of today, or for some countries of tomorrow, is much more free than before, but with this freedom comes insecurity, because it will clash with the other â??freeâ?? subjects. Therefore ethics should be concerned with the question how we can wield power to optimize the free space we have for ourselves, but to avoid harming the freedom of another. Philosophy should â??educateâ?? in values like tolerance, but also in assertivity, in assessing the wants and needs of the other, but also in self awareness, and most importantly in what way action of one subject influences the other.
In this education philosophy has an endless reflective task, because it has to realize that philosophy also is a human practice, and as such not power free. Which means that as far as possible philosophy should have a keen historic eye and realize that it is a product of its times, so should not be afraid to change its original standpoints to fit the needs of the time better.
Only as an endless self reflective practice can philosophy prevent itself from over confidence, from the idea that the philosophical interpretation is the most beneficent one. The only privilege philosophy might claim is reflectivity. A rigorously applied reflectivity might allow philosophy to transcend the power struggle and be as impartial as possible. If philosophy succeeds it can claim to be a beacon of ethics.
Hand in hand with reflectivity, philosophy must have an eye for the historic to succeed in keeping itself vital and to function as a mirror and guidance for those that not only think about, but also actively make policy.
Bibliography:
John Austin: How to Do Things with Words, Harvard University Press, Massachusetts, 1962
Chris Van der Heijden: O mooie grenzeloze wereld, In â??â??Vrij Nederlandâ??â??, 2003 issue 24
Kymlicka, W: Contemporary Political Philosophy, Oxford University press 1990
Lukes, S: Power, a radical view, London and Basingstoke, Macmillan 1974
Moss, J: The later Foucault, Sage publications, London, 1998
Nietszche, F: Jenseits von Gut und Böse, De Gruyter, Berlin, 1999
