Can Plato be criticised for ignoring human rights?Membership Status
Registration Date: Jul 24, 2004Usergroup: Sponsors
Articles Submitted: 10 articles
Total Comments: 0 (0 per day)
Total Time Online: 21 days, 19 hours and 59 minutes
Last seen: 08/16/09 - 01:12:33
Biographical Information
Location: Coventry, UKHomepage: http://www.voicesoffcamera.com/
Occupation: bohemian guru
Birthdate: August 19, 1985 (26 years old)
Interests: Philosophy, Sociology, Politics, Psychology
Biography: I hunt squirrels in a desperate attempt to win the esteem of strangers. I also have an increasing predilection for scotch (bought using the money some people reward me with in awe of my insatiable lust for squirrel genocide).
Contact Information
Guestbook: View or sign guestbook (0)Submission History
Most recent articles:Can Plato be criticised for ignoring human rights?
Find all articles submitted by nosos
By nosos
02/17/06 (Edited 05/04/07)
In this paper, I hope to investigate what role, if any, Plato allowed for human rights in his conception of a just society. Also, I intend to discuss what potential, if any, exists for meaningful criticism of Plato�??s political philosophy along these lines. Prima facie, it certainly seems difficult to find any moral or political conception of human rights underpinning Plato�??s account. The society Plato proposes is a rigidly class-stratified one, with the three classes (the guardians, the auxiliaries and the productive class) fulfilling strictly defined roles within society and living entirely different lives. The guardians, or philosopher rulers/kings, are possessed of absolute authority and they enact their rule through the actions of the auxiliaries. The producers lack autonomy and political power, though the exchange of jobs within their class is permitted as it is seen as doing little harm to the interests of the state1.
In contrast though, any attempt to change positions within the class structure is seen by Plato be the �??worst of all evils�?�2 as it spells �??destruction to our state�?�3. Justice for Plato lies in the maintenance of this class structure4. Each class is seen to correspond to the three elements of the human soul; the rational, the spirited and the appetitive, to which correspond the guardians, the auxiliaries and the productive classes respectively. A person is seen to be just for Plato when the three elements of their soul act in harmony5. It is in this harmony that the potential for human flourishing comes about. This is analogously true of the state. The class system is necessary for Plato because only through its maintenance can the other virtues emerge within the state. As Klosko observes6, �??Plato does not seem to value justice, the maintenance of the classes, greatly for its own sake�?�. The primacy of justice in Plato�??s account stems from the enabling role justice play7 (i.e. that the maintenance of the class system plays) in regards to the other virtues. It is through justice that discipline, courage and wisdom may come into being within the state and it is only through justice that they may be preserved7.
Already, we can see an account of a state, the political structure of which stands ill at ease with any notion of human rights. Within this state there exists an absolute inequality of power and Plato makes no attempt to obscure this fact. Annas suggests that for Greeks �??the paradigm of lacking power while another has it, is being his slave�?� 8. In this respect, one could argue that the relation between the guardians and the productive class is (superficially) tantamount to slavery. Unlike the guardians, the producers are seen by Plato as lacking the capacity for autonomy and self-mastery. Late in the Republic, Plato writes that �??wisdom and control should, if possible, come from within; failing that it must be imposed from without�?� 9. As a class, they are seen to be unable to utilise their autonomy satisfactorily and thus it is taken from them. In contrast the guardians have no limitations placed upon their power. Within Plato�??s state their authority is supreme.
It�??s important though that if we wish to consider Plato�??s account fairly, we understand that the paradigm of political analysis Plato operated within was radically different from any that has arisen from within the ideological constraints of pluralistic liberal democracy. For instance within liberal democratic thought, checks and balances on executive power are seen as a de facto condition of the executive�??s possession of that power. In contrast, from Plato�??s perspective, checks and balances on the power of the guardians are rendered entirely unnecessary by the wisdom they possess as a class and the special education which has engendered that wisdom. As Annas puts it10, �??the only constraint on the Guardian�??s treatment of others is their disinterested moral character�?�.
On a superficial reading of Plato�??s account, he could be taken as arguing for, essentially, a caste system and the institutionalisation of privilege and oppression. However this is, theoretically at least, not so. A more charitable interpretation would take the proposed state to be a class-stratified meritocracy. The guardian�??s are granted the power they are because of their wisdom and ability. They are responsible for the �??imposition from without�?? of the wisdom and control which the producing class are incapable of �??imposing from within�??11. This is just one facet of the virtue which earns them their place within Plato�??s state. Whereas the producing class are psychologically dominated by short-term thinking and appetitive desires12, the guardians are capable of planning on behalf of the city as a whole. Though his discussion of the unique education the guardians would undergo, as well as the radically different lives they would lead, could perhaps be seen to render this distinction of psychological capacities more plausible, such a discussion is beyond the scope of this paper. Never the less, if for charity�??s sake we accept Plato�??s distinction, a clear over-arching moral imperative emerges in favour of the Guardian�??s rule. The state doesn�??t become wise by virtue simply of the Guardian�??s presence within it. Rather, much as the primacy of the rational within the soul is a necessary prerequisite of psychological harmony, the primacy of the Guardians within the state�??s class structure is a necessary prerequisite of the state becoming wise. So we can see that from Plato�??s perspective, to stand against the Guardian�??s power is to stand against wisdom. How could one justify constraints on their power when such constraints would clearly, for Plato, stand in opposition to virtue?
More than this, Plato doesn�??t ever seriously consider the possibility that the Guardians might misuse their power. As Klosko puts it13 �??the key [for Plato] is to make sure that they are the kind of people who would gain nothing from doing so�?�. Plato conceives of the guardians as being the kind of men who �??will not consent to govern for cash or honours�?�14. Rather they will accept the charge of governance, reluctantly and stoically, because they recognise the absence of �??anyone better or equally qualified�?�15 and the undesirability of being governed by someone less qualified than themselves. The Guardians, in their wisdom, will know what is good for those they rule over and they accept their position in order that they might propagate virtue and further the common good. Indeed Plato sees no reason why, in spite of the disparity in power, the different classes cannot be friends16.
However, as earlier noted, to even tentatively accept the disparity of power within Plato�??s account necessitates that we first accept the distinction he draws between the psychological capacities of the Guardians and the producing class. We�??re presented with a clear division between those who are seen to be worthy of autonomy and those who are not and we�??re asked to accept the proposition that those who are deemed incapable of effectively utilising their autonomy deserve to be ruled, as a matter of ethical imperative, by those who are deemed capable. Prima facie, the proposition itself, not to mention the philosophical methodology underpinning it, stand in clear opposition to any notion of human rights.
That said, before we can continue any further with this investigation, it�??s necessary that we elucidate more precisely what we mean when we talk about human rights. At the most basic level, we can take the proposition that a person has a right to something as entailing that, in some sense, a protection should exist towards that end. For instance the notion of a right to private property entails that some social or political sanction should exist against the infringement of that right. A discussion of the philosophical and political origins of human rights is beyond the scope of this paper but, for the sake of brevity, we can point to Thomas Jefferson�??s proclamation of self-evident rights in the Declaration of Independence as being highly indicative of the notion of human rights as an entity in modern democratic discourse. In the Declaration of Independence17, Jefferson writes that �??we hold these truths to be self-evident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their creator with certain unalienable rights, that among these are life, liberty and the pursuit of happiness�?�. In it we can see a notion of human right as deriving transcendently from the basic facts of human commonality. Inference is made from the supposition of our fundamental equality that we possess, by virtue of that equality, certain inalienable rights imbued with an irreducible moral authority.
However, even now that we�??ve clarified what we mean when we talk about human rights, we�??re still left with the question of how meaningful it is to criticise Plato�??s account of a just society on this basis. In the first volume of his work �??the open society and its enemies�?� Karl Popper engages in a systematic and exhaustive philosophical critique of what he consider to be Plato�??s totalitarianism. Certainly, as we have seen, such a judgement seems eminently plausible from the a modern perspective; specifically in terms of the absence of human rights from his account and, more generally, in terms of the profoundly non-egalitarian character of the assumptions underlying his political methodology18. Yet, even so, Popper expresses a dissatisfaction with his own conclusions. He writes that19, �??I felt perhaps not so much that it was untrue, but that it was defective�?�. His dissatisfaction centres around Plato�??s professed hatred of tyranny. While it�??s crucial that we keep in mind the anti-democratic sentiment implied in Plato�??s hatred of tyranny (tyranny usually, in Greek times, making reference to rule based on mass/majority support) this, in itself, does not allay Popper�??s worries. Popper goes on to accept the genuine benevolence and concern for society�??s happiness underlying Plato�??s political project. Plato gives a number of proofs which he purported showed that the just person was indeed the happiest person20. Annas disputes however whether this rating of happiness is reflective of any concern for individual happiness. Rather, she holds that �??he thinks instead of the happiness appropriate to one as a member of a certain class�?�21. Certainly there seems to be textual evidence for this view e.g. �??our state will be built on the right basis, and, as it grows, we can leave each class to enjoy the share of happiness its nature permits�?�22. Even so, if, as earlier, we presuppose the validity of the distinctions Plato draws between the psychological capacities of the different classes, we can accept Popper�??s contention that Plato possessed a genuine concern for the happiness of all citizens within his proposed state; even if it may have been a concern greatly skewed by the aforementioned distinctions in psychological capacity.
Never the less, there is still the fundamental fact, observed by Klosko that �??though the state treats its members fairly, it cannot be said to grant them freedom�?�23. While on the one hand, we can understand this feature of Plato�??s account by making allowances for the fact that the �??individual�??, as the subject of liberty within democratic thought, did not exist in the same manner in Greek times24. On the other hand though, it�??s difficult to see how we can retain our capacity to make political and/or ethical judgements while at the same time making such allowances. Essentially the problem we are left with is a methodological one.
Certainly, it seems that Plato ignored human rights in his account of a just society. Yet when we consider the cultural specificity of the notion of human rights, we�??re left with the task of abstracting some underlying critical notion through which we might hope to make more meaningful trans-temporal criticisms. Certainly it seems plausible to hold that the proposition that �??Plato can be criticised for ignoring human rights�?? carries less force than the analogous proposition that �??[modern political philosopher] x can be criticised for ignoring human rights�??. If we look at the moral or political failings we see exhibited by a political philosopher who is criticised for ignoring human rights, we could be seen to be accusing them of a lack of concern for the protection of individual freedom and/or the well-being of all within society. Certainly with provisos25, Popper�??s earlier discussed postulation of Plato�??s fundamental benevolence seems plausible and, as such, we can dismiss the latter criticism of Plato. The former criticism is more difficult to assess. Certainly, as mentioned earlier, charitability dictates that we understand the differences between the notions of freedom that exist in our society and Plato�??s. As mentioned earlier, �??individual�?? freedom simply did not exist as a concept for Plato in the same way it does today. More than that though, the Greek�??s entire conception of the role of the individual in relation to the state differed to our own. No distinction was made between the Greek polis, or city state, and wider society. Also, in sharp contrast to the notion of inalienable rights we discussed earlier26, the rights possessed by individuals were possessed in relation to their status within society27.
Yet even if we were to entirely dismiss criticisms of Plato�??s lack of concern for individual freedom by making light (as above) of the fact that the terms of the criticisms are not, strictly speaking, relevant to Plato�??s account, it seems deeply unsatisfactory to subsequently conclude that his state is beyond moral or political reproach. Underlying the notion of human rights, we can point to a fundamental and irreducible concern for liberty28 as an end in itself. However this concern for our freedom to make choices and our freedom from having our choices made for us loses its force if we hold, as Plato did, that �??there is a single solution to all human problems�?�29. It is perhaps in these terms, rather than by directly invoking culturally specific notions of human rights, that we might criticise Plato. He doesn�??t value autonomy because autonomy necessitates that we be free to choose to live in ways which are not founded on (what he considered to be) moral truth and thus were demonstrably inferior ways of living. Our rejection of the notion of an all-encompassing and knowable objective moral truth entails our valuing political autonomy. The rejection of the idea that there is one right set of choices entails that each person ought to be granted the right to decide for themselves the direction of their own life. It also entails that we fully and forcefully reject Plato�??s state. Not because of it�??s lack of concern for human rights per se; rather for its position behind us on the road of progress into what Popper calls �??the open society�?�30. As Popper concludes31, �??we must go on into the unknown, courageously, using what reason we have to plan for security and freedom�?�. Plato sought to bring about progress by arresting political change yet, in actuality, the reverse has happened; progress has come about through the embrace of change and the propagation of man�??s critical capacities.
1. Republic 434a
2. Republic 434c
3. Republic 434b
4. In fact he sees it as the �??first and most important of God�??s commandments�?�. (Republic 415b)
5. Justice as pertaining to individual souls has been labelled �??psychic harmony�?? by some commentators. (Annas pg 132)
6. Klosko pg 138
7. �??it would be justice that was left over if we found the other three�?� (Republic 433c)
8. Annas pg 173
9. Republic 590d
10. Annas pg 172
11. Republic 590d
12. Annas pg 113
13. Klosko pg 140
14. Republic 347b
15. Republic 347d
16. The Greek word �??philoi�?? implying not personal affection but �??a certain kind of solidarity such as is normally felt in a common enterprise�?� (Annas pg117)
17. Declaration of Independence
18. Though Popper himself does not explicitly frame his critique in these terms.
19. Popper pg150
20. Republic 580d-583b and 583b-588b
21. Source Annas quote
22. Republic 421c
23. Klosko pg 151
24. Klosko pg151
25. Namely that we accept the distinction in psychological capacities Plato draws out between the two classes
26. Rights that extend from human commonality and, as such, are seen to exist separately from any state or society.
27. Klosko pg151
28. And, as an adjunct, the protection of liberty.
29. Klosko pg155
30. Such a society would be one which �??sets free the critical powers of man�?�. Popper pg1.
31. Popper pg117
